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Framing the Issues
In 1916 Jim Hurd went to work at the Roda No 2 mine in Virginia. As he
worked to cut and load coal one day, he could hear the roof creaking and
rumbling overhead. To prevent roof falls, he typically placed timbers in
strategic spots throughout the area of the mine where he was working.
Later in the day, Hurd left the area he had been working and met up with
Bill Donnelly, whom he stooped down to help move a tie for the coal car
tracks. A piece of slate fell out of the roof hitting Hurd and inflicting ser-
ious injuries. He died soon afterward, leaving a widow and infant chil-
dren.'
Since Hurd died in Virginia in 1916, any compensation his family re-
ceived from his employer depended in part on whether it could be shown
that the Stonega Coke and Coal Company was negligent. In this case be-
cause the fall of slate had occurred in an entryway, where the company
had responsibility to keep the roof safe, Stonega's lawyers felt that it was
likely that the court would consider the company negligent. Under com-
mon law, a court might have awarded Hurd's family a substantial sum that
would have paid them the value of his earnings over the rest of his normal
life. However, Stonega's lawyers had an array of legal defenses they could
invoke to prevent this outcome. For example, they could argue that Hurd
knew of the risks of a slate fall when he took the job and that Hurd was
already receiving extra compensation in his wages from Stonega to accept
these risks. Thus, Stonega could be freed from paying damages by this as-
sumption of risk defense.
Stonega had additional defenses if the cause of the accident had been
different. Say Hurd had stayed in his own workplace that day and been
killed by a fall of slate there. If Stonega's lawyers could have shown that
Hurd's coworker had failed to prop the roof in a timely fashion, then Sto-
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nega was freed of liability. They could have argued that Hurd's family
should sue his coworker for the damages because the coworker's negli-
gence caused the accident. Finally, say the accident was caused in part by
Hurd's own failure to prop the roof effectively. The lawyers could then
argue that Hurd's own negligence contributed to the accident, so that Sto-
nega was not required to pay.
Under negligence liability the judicial system had to follow a compli-
cated decision process that determined whether Hurd received compensa-
tion from Stonega. If the case went to court, the employer or the insurance
company paid legal defense fees, while families like Hurd's typically re-
tained a lawyer who would receive one-fourth to one-third of any pay-
ments the family received. If the family won the first round, Stonega's law-
yers were likely to appeal the decision. If the family could make a strong
case for employer negligence, they could fight it through the appeals court
and potentially win a large settlement, but the decision often would be
several years away and there still remained the risk of losing on appeal. In
fact, the vast majority of cases never reached a court decision. Both sides
could benefit by settling the issue quickly. Stonega could avoid their own
court costs, while Hurd's family could receive financial assistance to help
cover their necessities immediately. Stonega's generosity in settlements was
influenced by the cause of the accident. If they felt that they would eventu-
ally lose in court, they were likely to make a more generous offer, but one
that was well below the potential damages that might be awarded in court.
In Hurd's case, where the company feared that they might be found liable,
his brother demanded a settlement payment of eight thousand dollars.
After protracted negotiations, Stonega settled on a payment to the family
of twenty-five hundred dollars, half to the widow and half to Hurd's infant
children. In other cases, where the lawyers felt the company was not negli-
gent or that the worker was at fault, Stonega did not pay damages or
settled for one or two hundred dollars. On average, the results of several
surveys in various states suggest that about half the families of fatal acci-
dent victims received a positive payment from employers, and the typical
amount was about a year's income. For injured workers, Stonega and
other employers sometimes offered benefits like a free use of a company
house to the family for a period of time. If Hurd had not died, the coal
company might have employed him in a less demanding job until he re-
covered.
Given the relatively small amounts that Hurd's family might expect to
receive, Hurd and his family had to seek ways before the accident of pro-
tecting the family against the possibility that he might be injured or killed.
Hurd's mining wages were generally higher than in other industries, in
part as a reward for accepting the higher risk of mining. Many families
tried to increase their savings to have resources available to cover their
losses. An accident early in Hurd's career, however, would have led to10Chapter 1
expenses that easily overwhelmed the savings collected. A number of fami-
lies bought life insurance with an average payout of about one year's in-
come. The family faced more problems in buying insurance against acci-
dents that disabled him because premiums were expensive and access was
limited. Some employers helped workers establish mutual societies to pro-
vide a limited level of benefits for families.
Had Hurd been killed in Virginia in 1919, his family would have faced
an entirely different legal scenario. All Hurd's family essentially would
have had to show was that the accident occurred while he was working.
Whether he was at fault, Stonega was at fault, or Hurd's coworker was at
fault was irrelevant. The workers' compensation law spelled out the pay-
ment that Hurd's family would receive from Stonega based on his weekly
earnings. In Virginia in 1919, Hurd's family would have received one hun-
dred dollars for funeral expenses plus a weekly payment of half of his
earnings up to a maximum of ten dollars for three hundred weeks. The
process was simplified, although the family might have needed to retain
legal counsel if Stonega disputed whether the accident occurred on the
job, the level of Hurd's weekly earnings, or connections between Hurd and
his family. Had Hurd only been injured, there may have been disputes over
the extent of the injury and his medical costs. Taking into account all
accidents, no matter the cause and results ranging in severity from short-
term disability to death, Hurd and his family on average would have re-
ceived higher payments with the switch to workers' compensation. Under
negligence liability there was always the chance of much larger rewards
but there were substantial odds that they would receive no payments at
all. Under workers' compensation we estimate that employers wound up
paying out about one and one-half to three times as much to families of
accident victims than under negligence liability.
This transition in the treatment of Jim Hurd's family and other working
families not only involved a change in liability rules, it was a central step
in the development of the American welfare state. The goal of this book
is to answer two central questions: First, how might various groups have
gained from the adoption of workers' compensation? Second, what was
the process that led so many state legislatures to adopt workers' compen
sation laws? To answer both questions, we need to examine closely the
experiences of workers, employers, insurers, lawyers, and taxpayers during
the transition. Close study raises a host of issues: how closely the adminis-
tration of negligence liability and later workers' compensation followed
the liability rules; how the changes in liability influenced accident preven-
tion by employers and workers; the extent to which labor markets re-
warded workers for accepting greater risk or penalized them when acci-
dent benefits rose; and how well insurance companies could market
insurance in light of the problems they had in identifying the risks faced
by the purchasers of insurance and controlling changes in accident pre-Framing the Issues 11
vention efforts by the insured. We find that a substantial majority of em-
ployers, workers, and insurers gained from the transition. Yet there were
no guarantees that the legislation would pass. We therefore examine the
political economic process that led to adoption. This involves assessing
the strength of unions, manufacturers, lawyers, and insurers in the various
states, the extent to which progressive reformers had political clout in each
state, and the types of employers in the state. The success of legislation
depended on both state and local trends in wages, industrialization, legal
rules, and labor laws in each state.
We are not the first scholars to study the origins of workers' compensa-
tion. Walter Dodd (1936) and Herman and Anne Somers (1954) offered
thumbnail sketches of the reasons for the introduction of workers' com-
pensation as public interest legislation based on their reading of the em-
ployer liability reports from various states. They suggested that one reason
for the emergence of workers' compensation was the social insurance mo-
tive. Reformers decried the common law system of assigning negligence
as an anachronism because modern industrial processes created accidents
that were neither the fault of the worker nor of the employer, they were
simply the outcome of dangerous working conditions. Thus, restricting
compensation to cases where the employer was at fault left large numbers
of injured workers uncompensated, forced into poverty often through no
fault of their own. Further, the way the system worked under negligence
liability led to uncertain and greatly unequal payouts for accidents with
similar severity. Workers' compensation reduced these problems because
all injured workers received some form ofcompensation.2A second reason
for the transition away from the negligence-based system was to reduce
unnecessarily large transaction and administrative costs. Attorney's fees,
court costs, and the administrative costs of insurance left a 40 to 60 per-
cent gap between what employers paid out for postaccident compensation
and what workers ultimately received. The largest cost to injured workers
probably was the cost of court delays, which could last up to five years.
Reformers sought to reduce administrative costs, court delays, and insur-
ance overhead costs by creating a no-fault compensation system that elim-
inated disputes over negligence or the applicability of the three defenses.
Finally, because workers bore the disproportionate share of accident costs
under the negligence system, reformers argued that the negligence system
gave employers little incentive to reduce accident risk. By shifting the fi-
nancial burden of industrial accidents onto employers, reformers claimed,
accident rates would fall.
In hindsight, it is not clear that workers' compensation settled many of
these issues. Total administrative costs for workplace accidents did not
necessarily fall with the introduction of workers' compensation. The total
costs might even have risen because the number of cases administered rose
dramatically after the law was introduced. Further, since most cases under12Chapter 1
negligence liability were settled outside the courts, it is a very difficult to
determine even whether administrative costs per injury and average time
to compensation for injury declined.3 Insurance companies still included
significant load factors in the premiums they charged, although the shift
reduced problems with adverse selection.
The evidence that workers' compensation improved accident prevention
is mixed. Negligence liability gave employers incentive to prevent all acci-
dents where their prevention costs were lower than the expected damages.
Employers could obtain discounts in their liability premiums if their acci-
dent records improved and could reduce risk premiums in wages by mak-
ing their workplaces safer (Fishback and Kantor 1992). Reformers also
failed to consider moral hazard problems, as better insured workers might
have taken less care to prevent accidents. With workers potentially taking
less care and employers taking more care to avoid accidents, how overall
accident rates would change is theoretically uncertain. As discussed later
in chapter 3, empirical estimates vary. The adoption of workers' compen-
sation reduced accident rates in manufacturing (Chelius 1976), but raised
them in the coal mining iudustry (Fishback 1992, 112-25).
Workers' compensation, like most legislation, was not passed simply
because it was "in the public interest." Generally, opinions differed across
various interest groups, and a political coalition combining all or part of
these interest groups had to develop in the legislature for workers' com-
pensation to be adopted. Scholarly descriptions of the composition of this
political coalition vary. One of the common accounts of workers' compen-
sation's enactment is that politically influential social reformers of the time
helped workers score a significant victory over their employers (see, e.g.,
Noble 1997, 16). On the surface, this cursory observation rings true. The
average postaccident benefits for workplace injuries that workers received
under workers' compensation were significantly higher than those under
the negligence system. Moreover, in some important states, including Cali-
fornia, New York, and Washington, organized labor played a critical role
in securing the legislation (Nash 1963; Drescher 1970; Wesser 1971; Tripp
1976; Asher 1983; Pavalko 1989). In some states, labor's influence was even
more significant. Robert Asher (1983, 222) claims that thelabor unions'
successes in strengthening employers' liability laws in New York"fright-
ened employers and forced them to consider workers' compensation as
an alternative to a radical employers' liability system." Yet many of these
scholars also suggest that employers joined workers in favoring the legis-
lation.
A number of scholars have found that business leaders were the impetus
behind the adoption of the legislation. Weinstein (1967) argues that em-
ployers saw workers' compensation as a preemptive strike, designed to
reduce the necessity for labor to organize politically (see also Bale 1987).
Lubove (1967), on the other hand, contends that business supported work-Framing the Issues 13
ers' compensation because of the economic benefits that could be cap-
tured by substituting the stability of the compensation laws for the ran-
domness of the negligence liability system. As state legislatures began to
strip employers of their common law defenses, the National Association of
Manufacturers and many state-level business organizations saw workers'
compensation as a way to stem the tide of more frequent and larger jury
awards (also see Castrovinci 1976; Kent 1983; Tripp 1976). Workers' com-
pensation therefore did not seem like such a leap to employers given that
they were already required by the common law rules of negligence to com-
pensate workers injured in accidents caused by the employers' negligence
(Skocpol 1992, 296; Orloff 1993, 239).
Employers were troubled further that insurance companies were only
paying out 25 to 40 percent of their liability premiums to injured work-
ers; the remainder went to litigation costs, administrative expenses, and in-
surance company profits. Buffum (1992), Dodd (1936), and Somers and
Somers (1954) argue, for example, that employers supported workers'
compensation as a means to reduce the transaction costs of providing
remuneration to injured employees. Finally, Dodd (1936) and Somers and
Somers (1954) note that employers were becoming increasingly concerned
about the animosity that the negligence liability system created between
them and their employees. Many employers, therefore, may have viewed
workers' compensation as a profit-enhancing strategy because it was ex-
pected to cut costs and to enhance productivity. In fact, after many states
had already adopted workers' compensation laws, Willard Fisher (1920,
19) wrote in the American Economic Review that "by many tokens employ-
ers have shown their approval of the system. ... Much thelarger numbers
of employers affected have accepted their new obligations cheerfully"
Tone (1997, 49) is much more cynical about employers' support of work-
ers' compensation, however. She claims that by "savvily labeling workers'
compensation laws as a 'great but uncertain experiment' in social legisla-
tion whose long-term impact was unknown, the NCF [National Civic Fed-
eration] made its lukewarm support of workers' compensation laws the
basis for a full-fledged assault, couched in the vocabulary of prudence and
caution, on other social insurance measures."
Workers' compensation was not class-based legislation implemented
from the bottom up or from the top down. Workers did not obtain large
gains at the expense of employers, nor were recalcitrant workers coerced
into accepting the terms of this "uncertain experiment" by their employ-
ers. Each group supported workers' compensation in the political negotia-
tions willingly because they anticipated gains from the switch to the new
regime. Employers gained a reduction in the uncertainty surrounding their
accident costs and saw reduced frictions with their workers, as other schol-
ars have noted. On the surface it appears that they paid too much for these
gains because the switch to workers' compensation led to a substantial14Chapter 1
increase in the amounts they paid for accidents. However, as shown in
chapter 3, employers were able to pass on to workers a large portion of
the higher costs of postaccident payment through reductions in real wages.
Thus, employers gained greater certainty and reduced friction without hav-
ing to pay for most of the increase in benefit levels. Risk-averse workers,
despite "buying" the higher benefits through a drop in their wages, gained
because under negligence liability they had problems purchasing their de-
sired levels of accident insurance. The switch to workers' compensation
left them better insured against workplace accident risk. Finally, insurance
companies willingly supported the legislation, as long as it did not allow
the state to write workers' compensation legislation, because they could
expand their coverage of workplace accident risk.
If the major economic interests anticipated gains from workers' com-
pensation, what actually facilitated the law's adoption? This question, on
the surface, seems rather mundane, but in fact is particularly important in
light of recent research that finds that efficiency-promoting institutional
changes can be delayed, while inefficient institutions persist. Unraveling
this puzzle requires a detailed and comprehensive study of the way in
which economic interests are filtered through the political process. Previ-
ous work on the development of workers' compensation falls short of this
goal. The two quantitative studies of the determinants of the legislation
that have been conducted treat the legislative process as in a vacuum, ab-
stracted from the rich differences in compensation laws, and omit a num-
ber of potential determinants of the laws (see Pavalko 1989; Buffum 1992).
Moreover, the historical studies tend to focus on one particular state and
it is difficult to draw broad conclusions without comparing multiple stud-
ies. In addition, the previous research on the origins of workers' compen-
sation has not attempted to empirically measure the economic or distribu-
tional consequences of the legislation.
We use a blend of quantitative and qualitative studies to develop a com-
prehensive interpretation of the origins of workers' compensation. Many
of the scholars cited here agree with the general statement that workers'
compensation legislation was supported by both employers and work-
ers. They did excellent work in identifying the written and oral political
stances taken by the various interest groups and the struggles in the legis-
lature to pass the laws in various states. Yet they offer little more than a
cursory description of the operations of the negligence liability system, of
the changes in the amount of payments received by injured workers under
the two systems, and of the impact of the workers' compensation law on
wages, accident rates, insurance purchases, and savings. This book offers
an in-depth discussion of these issues as well as a quantitative analysis of
the speed with which states enacted the legislation and the parameters of
the lawsuch as state versus private insurance of workers' compensation
risk and the level of accident benefitsthat different states chose. As aFraming the Issues 15
result, it complements, deepens, and in some areas contradicts the analysis
of earlier scholars. Using empirical techniques and case studies, we are
able to identify underlying forces and relationships that help explain some
of the puzzles the earlier scholars left behind.
1.1An Analytical Framework
Institutions are the rules that govern human interactions. They include
laws, regulations, customs, mores, religion, and any other sets of con-
straints that people impose on themselves to structure their social, eco-
nomic, or political lives. Early research on institutional development held
that they were organized in order to maximize economic efficiency (Dem-
setz 1966, 1967; Davis and North 1971; Alchian and Demsetz 1973; North
1981). On the specific issue of liability for accidents, there is an extensive
literature in law and economics that is devoted to discussions of the opti-
mal choice of liability rules (see, e.g., Posner 1972; Brown 1973; Epstein
1973; Shavell 1980, 1987; Veljanovski 1982). In general the discussion has
focused on minimizing the sum of accident prevention costs and the ex-
pected damages from accidents (probability of the accident times the dam-
age done). If the goal, however, is to provide the optimal amount of social
insurance, the problem becomes far more difficult because there are no
widely accepted definitions of what that would entail. Under one extreme
definition, optimal social insurance requires that all workplace accident
victims be fully compensated. Yet such an extreme might not be satisfac-
tory to those who believe in individual responsibility and that workers who
do not take simple actions to protect themselves should not be allowed to
receive income from employers who do their best to prevent accidents.
There are settings where the sum of prevention costs and expected dam-
ages is minimized and workers are fully covered when injured, butthis
arises only under very extreme assumptions. Say there are zero transac-
tions costs and information can be obtained without cost about the extent
of the dangers faced in the workplace and about the workers' and employ-
ers' prevention activity. What would happen if the employer bore no liabil-
ity whatsoever for workplace accidents? Employers with more dangerous
workplaces would be forced to pay a wage premium to their workers. In
a perfectly functioning labor market where the employer andinsurance
companies are risk neutral and the workers are slightly risk averse, the
wage premium would be equated with the expected damagefrom acci-
dents. Given that information costs are zero, insurance companies could
effectively overcome problems with identifying which workers faced which
dangers so that they would not face problems with adverse selection. Fur-
ther, with zero transactions costs insurance companies could design insur-
ance contracts that gave workers less incentive to keep from adopting
more dangerous practices once insured, consequentlysolving problems16Chapter 1
with moral hazard. Thus, workers would be able to take their wage risk
premium and buy insurance that fully covered their losses.4
Even though the employer legally bears no costs of workplace dangers,
the worker still receives full compensation when injured through a combi-
nation of wage payments and insurance purchases. Employers would have
incentives to try to reduce the workplace risks in cases where the reduction
in expected damages was greater than their costs of lowering the risks
because they can reduce the risk premium that they pay to workers. They
would write contracts with workers to get the workers to prevent accidents
for which workers had lower prevention costs.
In theory, we might see the same final outcome if the liability were fully
shifted to the employer.5 The employer pays the worker full damages
when injured and thus the worker would no longer require a risk premium
in wages. The employer could either self-insure or purchase insurance to
cover these accident costs. Again, the employer has incentive to prevent
accidents where the expected damage exceeds the cost of prevention, ei-
ther because he can reduce his payments for accidents or he can reduce
the size of his insurance premiums. Further, the employer can contract
with the worker to have the worker exercise optimal accident prevention.
In such a frictionless world a social insurance program for accident risk
is not needed. Injured workers receive full compensation for their expected
lost income and medical expenses and thus they and their families no
longer become paupers. Workers and employers can write contracts that
develop the proper incentives for eliminating the kinds of accidents where
the costs of prevention are lower than the expected damages from the ac-
cident. In essence, this is an example of the Coase conjecture that through
negotiations we can end up at the same optimal point whether we assign
the liability to one party or the other (Coase 1960).
Yet frictions do in fact exist and they play an important role in de-
termining the nature of political economic activity and regulation. In fact,
Coase's conjecture, like the discussion above, is just a staging ground from
which we can identify how transactions costs and information costs get in
the way of the operation of markets and try to explore the choice of liabil-
ity rules. Employers and workers face various costs in writing individual
labor and insurance contracts, monitoring the behavior of the other party
to the contract, and obtaining information about the risks ofjobs. Mean-
while, insurance companies face problems in determining the specific risks
faced by the purchasers of insurance and in guarding against the insured
taking extra risks once insured. Once a liability rule is established, there
are costs to courts or bureaucracies of administering the rules and adjudi-
cating the disputes that might arise. All of these costs are present to vary-
ing degrees in every empirical setting, making it nearly impossible to iden-
tify "the optimal liability rule" on theoretical grounds.
The correct answer as to what is the optimal liability changes as weFraming the Issues 17
focus on different costs. Steven Shave!! (!980, 2!-22), for examp!e, re!axed
on!y the assumption about the workers' know!edge of the accident risk.
His carefu! ana!ysis shows that if workers have know!edge of on!y the
average risk on the job and not the specific risk they wou!d face for that
job, on!y neg!igence !iabi!ity wi!! maximize his measure of socia! we!fare,
the sum of the expected incomes of a!! parties. However, if workers do not
have fu!! information about the average risk, then neg!igence !iabi!ity wi!!
be "inefficient" too. Consider that Shave!! re!axed on!y one of the assump-
tions. Re!axation of another sing!e assumption !eads to a different answer
about the optima! !iabi!ity ru!e. Once we re!ax a!! of the assumptions, there
is no theoretica! so!ution to the "optima!" !iabi!ity ru!e. The search for
optima!ity becomes an empirica! exercise devoted to comparing imperfect
ru!es based on accurate measures of transactions, information, and ad-
ministrative costs and their impact on the operation of !abor and insur-
ance markets. Unfortunate!y, the size of these costs often defies accurate
measurement, so that we are !eft with inferentia! techniques.
The adoption of workers' compensation was a move from neg!igence
!iabi!ity with the !ega! defenses of assumption of risk, contributory neg!i-
gence, and fe!!ow servant to a form of no-fau!t !iabi!ity where workers
were not fu!!y compensated for their lost earnings. Neg!igence !iabi!ity
offers the emp!oyer the incentive to prevent a!! accidents where his costs
of prevention exceed the expected damage for the accident. In this setting
workers have extra incentives to prevent accidents because they wi!! not
be compensated for any accidents where the emp!oyer was not neg!igent.
The contributory neg!igence defense adds extra incentive for the worker
to prevent accidents because the worker receives nothing if he cou!d have
prevented the accident at costs !ower than the expected damage, even if
the emp!oyer was neg!igent. In rea!-wor!d settings the incentives created
by neg!igence !iabi!ity are di!uted somewhat because the use of the court
system is cost!y and often invo!ves substantia! de!ays. Most of the accident
compensation is determined through out-of-court sett!ements where the
!iabi!ity ru!e might be on!y one of severa! factors that determine the com-
pensation paid. Genera!!y, the operation of neg!igence ru!es !eads to a
!arge number of accidents where the worker receives no payments from
his emp!oyer. As a resu!t, workers seek higher pay to accept accident risk
and succeed in obtaining a partia! risk premium in their wages, but the
premium is typica!!y not enough to fu!!y cover their expected !osses. A
risk-averse worker might use the risk premium in his wages to try to buy
insurance, but the insurance company is going to have prob!ems se!!ing
him insurance if the insurer cannot obtain re!iab!e information about the
risk the worker faces. If insurers have on!y !imited information about the
risks faced by individua! workers, they wi!! have prob!ems with adverse
se!ection if they just set a rate and offer fu!! coverage. Typica!!y, they wi!!
sustain !osses if they fo!!ow this pricing strategy because on!y the workers18Chapter 1
faced with higher risks will purchase insurance. To resolve this problem
the companies will limit how much they sell to workers. Further, the insur-
ers will try to limit payouts to prevent against problems with moral haz-
ard. Thus, workers may have to use alternative, more costly methods, like
precautionary saving to provide for their families in case of an accident.
The switch to workers' compensation liability, where the employer is li-
able for all accidents arising out of or in the course of employment, changes
the structure of accident prevention. Employers are no longer freed from
liability for a wide range of accidents. The total payments they make for
accidents might go up or go down. In fact, we show that the switch to
workers' compensation in the United States forced them to increase their
accident payments. The employers did not bear the full burden of this
increase because they were able to pass at least some of the costs back to
their workers in the form of wage offsets. Workers essentially paid for an
improvement in their insurance. The higher levels of accident payments
gave employers more incentives to prevent accidents than before. The no-
fault payments also change the prevention calculus for workers, who now
have less incentive to exercise care. Insurers may gain in one dimension
because now employers have incentive to buy insurance to cover the pay-
ments to all of the workers on their payroll. As a result, insurers have
fewer problems with adverse selection among the workers in each firm.
On the other hand, with the rise in accident payments, the moral hazard
problem by workers may become more severe. This problem was partially
resolved under workers' compensation because the worker received at
most two-thirds of his income when injured, and therefore bore a signifi-
cant part of the damage of an accident. In the final analysis, the switch to
workers' compensation in the United States left workers better insured
against workplace accidents than before. They at least partially paid for
higher accident benefits. At the same time it is unclear whether prevention
efforts rose or fell because the accident prevention incentives went in op-
posite directions for employers and workers.6
In this book we do not try to measure the relative efficiency of the two
systems of employer liability and workers' compensation. A comparison
of relative efficiency would require us to examine the sum of prevention
costs, expected damages, transactions costs, and administrative costs un-
der the two regimes. At one stage we thought we could measure all of the
relevant costs and benefits effectively, yet our efforts and the efforts of
many others have fallen well short of expectations. Instead, we follow a
different tactic. We try to establish information about factors that we can
measure. How much were injured workers paid under the two regimes?
How well did the actual system of employer liability follow the common
law rules on which it was based? When workers' compensation was intro-
duced, how did wages, savings, and accident rates change? What happened
to the number of accidents compensated? By answering these difficultFraming the Issues 19
questions, we try to establish what employers, insurers, and workers could
anticipate they would gain or lose as a result of the transition away from
employer liability to workers' compensation. Once we knew what their
gain or loss would be, we could then determine whether they would be
likely to support workers' compensation legislation. By following this pro-
cess we have discovered in fact that workers' compensation,with its form
of limited no-fault liability, was legislation that benefited a large majority
of employers, workers, and insurers. The results do not offer a general
prescription for the optimal choice among no liability, strict liability, negli-
gence liability, or the variations and combinations thatdevelop from inte-
grating contributory negligence with other defenses. However, the results
do suggest that given the presence of various frictions at the time it was
adopted, workers' compensation appears to have been beneficial legisla-
tion for a substantial majority of the actors involved. Thus we can learn
for general purposes that in a society faced with the sets of constraints
that were in place around 1910, workers' compensation might well have
been the optimal way to deal with workplace accidents.
If workers' compensation was indeed an institutional arrangement that
increased social wealth, should we expect that the program would be
adopted? In the early days of the new institutional economics, scholars
answered yes (see Demsetz 1966, 1967; Davis and North 1971; Alchian
and Demsetz 1973). Since that time, many scholars including the early
ones (see North 1981, 1987) have recognized that transaction costs and
distributional conflicts are not always easily overcome and often can slow
the adoption of income-enhancing institutional change. It is typically
when these barriers stand as impediments to institutional change that the
relevant interest groups petition the government for a political solution.
But once the process of institutional change is politicized, there is no guar-
antee that relatively beneficial regimes survive while the inefficient ones
decay. Indeed, as Gary Libecap (1989b, 7) notes, "the heart of the con-
tracting problem is devising politically-acceptable allocation mechanisms
to assign the gains from institutional change, while maintaining its pro-
duction advantage." But the prospects for such an outcome might not be
so bright, for as North (1987, 422) concludes, "one of the mostevident
lessons from history is that political systems have an inherent tendency to
produce inefficient property rights which result in stagnation and decline."
Despite the importance that scholars of economic development attri-
bute to institutions, there are relatively few detailed empirical analyses
of the process of institutional change.7 What causes individuals to seek
changes in their institutional environment? What impedes the way of prof-
itable institutional change? How are these barriers overcome? How do the
different interest groups with a stake in the new regime translate their eco-
nomic objectives into political action, if in fact a political solution is called
for? What are the economic consequences of the institutional changes; do20Chapter 1
they lead to the economic improvements that proponents promise? One
of the main difficulties that researchers of institutional change have faced
is that each individual case has its own set of answers to these questions
and generalizing the results of the case studies into a general theory of
the process of institutional change has proven difficult. The variables that
explain what happened in one instance may do very poorly in predicting
what will occur in another.
While this book does not offer a solution to this dilemma, we believe
that our approach provides an analytic framework for studying how insti-
tutions evolve. Our goal in the book is to trace the process of one particu-
lar institutional change from its inception to its conclusion, highlighting
the salient ways in which economic interests are filtered into public policy.
Our research objective is not only to understand the economic causes and
consequences of the adoption of workers' compensation, but also to ex-
plain how politics affected the ultimate form of the legislation. The fea-
tures of workers' compensation laws varied across the United States, and
it is this cross-sectional variation that provides the opportunity to study
how differences in interest groups' political strengths determine the path
and scope of institutional change.
We seek to show how the economic and political environment influ-
enced the passage of complex legislation. Our research methodology has
three major components. First, we devote extensive efforts to identifying
the gains and losses that various interest groups anticipated from the pas-
sage of workers' compensation. While we can learn a great deal from ex-
amining the public statements of those groups with a stake in the legisla-
tion, understanding how workers' compensation directly affected these
groups economically provides us with valuable information about their
possible political stance on the law. Our assumption is that political actors
could reasonably anticipate the economic consequences of the policies
they promoted.8 Our quantitative analyses of the nature of postaccident
benefits before and after workers' compensation and the impact of work-
ers' compensation on wage rates, accident rates, and household choices
among consumption, saving, and insurance purchases has established that
workers, employers, and insurance companies all received and could antic-
ipate benefits from workers' compensation.
The second major task of our analysis is to determine the context of the
transition to workers' compensation. If the major interest groups with a
stake in the legislation saw benefits from its adoption, what were the cata-
lysts that sparked the rapid acceptance of the legislation across the United
States between 1910 and 1920? We do not claim to provide a comparative
analysis of workers' compensation's legislative success relative to that of
social insurance programs. The book, however, does provide insights into
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Era, while other programs, such as unemployment insurance, social health
insurance, and old-age insurance, were dismissed.
The third strand of our research considers how economic interests were
translated into political outcomes. Using a combination of quantitative
and qualitative case-study analyses, our goal is to more carefully identify
how the political process determined not only the timing of adoption but
also the specific form workers' compensation legislation took. These de-
tails of the legislation are particularly important because they determined
how income would be (re)distributed under the law. While our argument
is that employers and workers as a group expected benefits from workers'
compensation, we would be remiss to consider the interests of all employ-
ers or workers as monolithic. For example, larger or more productive firms
may have had a cost advantage in implementing safety equipment and
programs that would have lowered their insurance rates. We might conjec-
ture that such firms supported workers' compensation as a means of rais-
ing the relative costs of production for their smaller competitors. Employ-
ers in industries where they could easily invoke their common law defenses
might not have supported workers' compensation because their costs of
accident compensation would have risen dramatically under the new sys-
tem. Similarly, employers in relatively safe industries may not have sup-
ported workers' compensation if insurance rates were not fully experience
rated because employers with better safety records would end up subsidiz-
ing the insurance for employers with worse safety records.
While employers, workers, and insurance companies were the primary
groups affected by the legislation, attorneys, taxpayers, farmers, and state
bureaucrats had a stake in the outcome as well. Insurance companies, for
example, fought against laws that allowed the state to compete in the writ-
ing of workers' compensation insurance. Damage suit attorneys stood to
lose as workers' compensation would eliminate a part of their practices,
and in some states they effectively slowed the adoption of the legislation.
On the other hand, some damage suit attorneys and many lawyers with
other specialties actively pressed for workers' compensation. Taxpayers in
some states opposed the legislation on the grounds that it would create
new expensive bureaucracies, raise the costs of paying public employees,
or establish state funds that might require taxpayer subsidies. State labor
department officials lobbied for workers' compensation legislation on the
grounds that it would expand their influence over labor regulation in the
state.
Our analysis of the political process blends several general themes from
the economics and political science literatures on political decisionmak-
ing. We assume that legislators and other political decisionmakers seek
to maximize their own objectives subject to a series of constraints. The
constraints are imposed by the demands of voting constituents who have22Chapter 1
some control over each lawmaker's reelection (Downs 1957;Mayhew
1974; Fiorina 1977), by interest group pressures (Stigler 1971; Peltzman
1976; Hughes 1977; Becker 1983; Olson 1982), by institutional features of
the decision process, such as constitutional proscriptions and legislative
committee structure (Shepsle and Weingast 1981, 1984; Denzau and Mac-
kay 1983; Weingast and Marshall 1988), and by pressures to maintain
their position in a political coalition either for ideological or economic
reasons (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). In our detailedempirical studies of
the adoption of workers' compensation in various states, we pay close
attention to how these constraints that legislators faced influenced the
path of institutional change.
1.2Outline of the Book
The plan of the book generally follows the three major themes high-
lighted above. Before discussing the adoption of workers' compensation,
in the next chapter we provide a detailed description of the legal envi-
ronment that preceded the legislation. While it is obviously important to
understand the historical context out of which workers' compensation
emerged, a detailed picture of the negligence liability system serves an-
other purpose as well. In their effort to explain the rationale for workers'
compensation, law and economics scholars have analyzed the relative
efficiency of the new legal regime relative to its common law predecessor
(see, e.g., Posner 1972; Brown 1973; Epstein 1973; Shavell 1980, 1987; Vel-
janovski 1982). They generally assume that the actual payment of accident
compensation followed the de jure rules of the two systems. In their analy-
ses of negligence liability, for instance, injuredworkers either receive full
compensation for their losses when the employer is negligent and cannot
invoke one of the common law defenses, or the workers receive nothing.
Under workers' compensation injured workers recover up to two-thirds of
their lost income for all accidents arising out of or in the course of employ-
ment. Because the results of these theoretical models are sensitive to their
underlying assumptions, our goal in chapter 2 is to provide a careful em-
pirical assessment of how injured workers in fact fared under the common
law. We know that the vast majority of negligence claims were settled out
of court to avoid the substantial costs of seeking a court decision. In this
setting the common law rules may have had a distorted impact on the
actual compensation payments that injured workers received. A better un-
derstanding of the de facto operation of the negligence system, therefore,
serves as the basis for more accurate theoretical discussions of therelative
efficiency of negligence and no-fault legal systems.
In chapter 3 we discuss the major economic changes that resulted from
workers' compensation. Our aim is to understand how various economic
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what they might have reasonably anticipated would happen. First, how-
ever, we establish how workers' compensation changed the natureof post-
accident benefits. We show that not only did the percentage of injured
workers receiving remuneration increase, but also the average amount they
received increased substantially. Our evidence indicates that the average
payments to the households of accident victims increased between 75 and
200 percent as a result of the adoption of workers' compensation. We
then turn to the economic consequences of this large increase in average
postaccident payments. An analysis of wage rates in three relatively dan-
gerous industries shows that nonunion workers experienced a drop in their
real wages as a result of the legislation, but unionized workers in the build-
ing trades and coal mining confronted much smaller wage offsets. That
most workers essentially "paid" for the relatively generous postaccident
benefits that workers' compensation mandated helps to explain why em-
ployers willingly supported the legislation. What is less clear is why work-
ers were such enthusiastic partners in the push for a new legal regime.
An examination of how workers' compensation influenced households'
savings and insurance decisions sheds light on this apparent paradox. We
show that workers around the turn of the century faced constraints in
their ability to purchase private insurance against workplace accident risk.
Thus, despite buying workers' compensation benefits through lower real
wages, nonunion workers supported the legislation because it left them
better insured against workplace accident risk than under the negligence
system. Further, as long as the state did not attempt to exclude them,
insurance companies thought that the legislation was a good idea as well
because it enabled them to expand their coverage of this line of risk.
If the major economic interest groups with a stake in workers' compen-
sation anticipated gains, why did state legislators wait until the 1910s to
adopt the law rather than adopting it earlier? In chapter 4 we provide an
examination of the changes in the negligence liability system across the
United States in the early 1 900s that shows that several trends combined
to pique the major interest groups' political support of workers' compen-
sation. Workplace accident risk rose, state legislatures adopted a series of
laws weakening employers' common law defenses against negligence, and
court decisions also began to limit employers' defenses in liability suits.
These factors together served to substantially increase liability insurance
premiums. Employers, facing an increasingly worsening workplace ac-
cident liability crisis, were commonly in favor of workers' compensation
by 1910. At the same time, labor unions, which were gaining numerical
strength, shifted their focus from reforming the negligence system to fully
supporting workers' compensation. Thus, by 1910 politically active em-
ployers' groups and labor unions pressed for the enactment of workers'
compensation. Analysis of the timing of adoption across the United States
confirms our hypothesis that a worsening negligence liability crisis served24Chapter 1
as a catalyst that brought the major interest groups together in favor of
reform.
In chapter 5 we elaborate further on the process by which workers' com-
pensation was enacted. While quantitative analysis of the timing of adop-
tion across the United States provides a useful test of our hypothesis that
a liability crisis triggered the movement in favor of workers' compensa-
tion, the quantitative analysis treats the political process of adoption
within each state as a black box. Therefore, in this chapter we provide a
number of synopses drawn from detailed case studies that illuminate the
dynamics of institutional change. The studies highlight the difficulty that
interest groups have in forming a cohesive coalition in favor of reform.
The difficulty is not only in getting employers, insurers, and workers to
agree, but also in getting factions within each broad interest group to agree
on the type of legislation that they would support.
Given that the major interest groups anticipated gains from workers'
compensation, it seems surprising that contemporary accounts sometimes
depicted the adoption process as extremely bitter. In exploring this seem-
ing paradox, it is important to consider that the legislation was very com-
plex and involved negotiations over many different specific details of the
law, including the choice between private and state insurance of workers'
compensation risk and the level of statutory benefits. The details of the law
were important because they determined how income would be distributed
under workers' compensation.
Probably the most vicious debates were fought over the state insurance
issue. Union groups particularly had antipathy toward the insurance com-
panies, seeing them as a key reason why injured workers were unable to
receive adequate compensation under negligence liability. Unions, there-
fore, lobbied vigorously for the replacement of private insurers with state
insurance. For their part, insurance companies saw state insurance as an
encroachment on their private enterprise and feared the government's fur-
ther expansion into other forms of insurance. The result was a series of
intense disagreements in state legislatures around the country. In chapter
6 we report the results of a quantitative analysis of state legislatures' deci-
sions on the state insurance debate. Further, we conduct detailed case
studies of the political debate in Minnesota, Ohio, and Washington. These
studies show that a combination of unions and progressive reformers over-
came the opposition of insurance companies and agricultural interests to
adopt monopoly state insurance schemes in seven states. In ten other
states the groups compromised and a state fund was created that competed
with private insurers in underwriting workers' compensation. In the re-
maining states the insurance and agricultural interests won and employers
were free to insure their workers' compensation risks with any insurer li-
censed to do business in the state.
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strength of the different groups affected state legislators' choices of benefit
levels. We have developed a theoretical model that predicts the optimal
benefits from the perspective of workers and employers with different
characteristics. We then use these predictions as a basis for understanding
the effectiveness of interest groups in politically securing their optimal
workers' compensation benefit levels. A quantitative analysis of expected
benefit levels from 1910 to 1930 reveals that influential employers in high
accident risk industries succeeded in lobbying for relatively low benefits,
holding other factors constant, while those in high wage industries suc-
ceeded in keeping benefit levels in check. Employers' successes in securing
their optimal benefits were tempered in states where organized labor was
strong, where political reform movements led to political shifts in the state
legislature, and where bureaucratic agencies administered the workers'
compensation system.
Comparison of the results from chapters 4 and 5 with those in chapters
6 and 7 reveals an important feature of the adoption of workers' compen-
sation that previous scholars have overlooked. Generally, we have found
that progressive reformers had a comparatively small impact on state legis-
latures' decisions to adopt the general legislation for workers' compensa-
tion. In contrast, when it came to the adoption of state insurance or choos-
ing benefit levels, the strength of political reform movements often played
a decisive role. The difference stems from the attitudes of the various inter-
est groups. A strong political reform movement was not necessary for the
adoption of workers' compensation more generally because the main
groups with a stake in the legislation anticipated benefits. On the other
hand, when at least two of these interest groups squared off against each
other on a particular issue, the political reformers' influence became de-
cisive in a number of cases. These results provide new insights into the
political success of workers' compensation during the Progressive Era.
Workers' compensation succeeded, while many other relatively "radical"
reforms failed, because it received the support of a broad range of interest
groups. The social reformers, who had hoped for sweeping social insur-
ance protection for workers, had their greatest influence when the major
interest groups agreed to the general principle, but had difficulty reaching
a consensus on the details.
Notes
1. This event is described in Stonega Coke and Coal Company, "Operating Re-
port, 1916," from records of Stonega Coke and Coal Company, Hagley Museum
and Library, p. 56. The donors of the manuscript collection require that we use
pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the families of these men.26Chapter 1
The American Association of Labor Legislation pressed the argument for
workers' compensation as one form of social insurance. See Seager (1910), Ru-
binow (1913), Moss (1996), and Tone (1997, 32).
Whether workers' compensation led to a reduction in marginal transactions
costs per case depends on the administration of the new workers' compensation
system. Costs per case may have been lower in states with a state insurance fund,
but possibly the same or higher in other states. In Ohio, Washington, and West
Virginia, where there were exclusive state funds, the processing of claims was al-
most perfunctory. Carl Hookstadt (1922, 4, 6-7) found that administrative costs
per worker were lower than in states with competitive state funds or insurance by
private stock companies, in part because state funds were more liberal in compen-
sating workers and challenged fewer claims before industrial commissions. This
liberality lowered total legal fees for workers in Ohio, where relatively few workers
hired lawyers when going before the industrial commission (Conyngton 1917, 70-
71). In Virginia, Colorado, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Indiana, where private
insurance was allowed, administrative costs per case might have been the same as
under negligence liability In these states, compensation was determined through
voluntary agreements between the injured miner and the company The states' In-
dustrial Commissions reviewed the agreement and settled disputes. This process
seems very similar to the situation under the negligence system in which most
claims were settled out of court. If the costs per settlement were similar under the
two systems, the increased number of claims would have raised total administrative
costs under workers' compensation above those for the negligence system. The
difference in costs may be larger when disputed cases are considered. The Stonega
Coke and Coal Company, which self-insured, was involved in approximately ninety
hearings of contested cases before the Virginia Industrial Commission between
1924 and 1926. Stonega's lawyers considered each hearing to have required "al-
most as much legal work done as would have been necessary if there had been a
trial at law before a court." Under the negligence system, Stonega's annual reports
for 1916-1918 mention only fifty lawsuits, of which thirty-one were settled out of
court (operating reports of the Stonega Coke and Coal Co., Report of the Legal
Division, 1921, 225, and operating reports for 1916-1926 in boxes 210-212 in the
Records of the Stonega Coke and Coal Co., Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmin-
gton, Delaware). On the other hand, insurance companies may have seen the costs
of offering insurance per dollar paid to injured workers fall with the move to work-
ers' compensation to the extent that a reduction in problems with adverse selection
offset any problems with problems in detecting fraud. In the final analysis, we do
not know for sure whether the costs per case and/or the total administrative costs
fell with the introduction of workers' compensation.
Workers would not need to demand higher than the expected damages if they
know that they can purchase insurance. However, if there were administrative costs
of the insurance, then workers would demand a risk premium large enough to
cover the costs of their insurance.
This statement is subject to some caveats about the Coase theorem in game
theoretic settings.
Spillover effects are additional problems that complicate the discussion of
liability rules and accident prevention. Spillover effects are most problematic for
accidents between strangers, for example, automobile accidents. If a number of
motorists are uninsured, problems may arise for insured motorists. If the unin-
sured motorist causes a serious accident with another automobile, he is likely to
be unable to fully compensate the other party for the losses sustained. Thus, the
other party either bears the unmet cost of this loss at the time of the accident or
is forced to pay higher premiums for insurance to cover this loss. Such spilloverFraming the Issues 27
effects are likely to be less problematic in workplace injuries because the employ-
ment relationship contains many ties between the worker, the employer, and his
fellow worker that are not present in the meeting of strangers. These ties include
formal and informal arrangements between the parties for providing appropriate
accident prevention.
Under the old negligence system, some of the costs of accidents to uninsured
workers were borne by others because families were able to obtain help from chari-
ties and meager payments from local governments. These payments were small,
however, and the social stigma was large enough that this did not cause a serious
mismatch of incentives. Under negligence liability with fellow servant defense,
there may have been a spillover problem when a fellow worker caused the accident.
According to the fellow servant defense, the fellow worker who caused the acci-
dent, and not the employer, was required to compensate the accident victim. Since
the fellow worker's wealth was low, the fellow worker would have been unable to
compensate the worker fully for his loss. We have not found any evidence that
workers were purchasing liability insurance to cover their obligations if they
caused an accident to a fellow worker. Nor have we found cases of workers suing
fellow workers for damages, possibly because such suits seemed futile. Therefore,
there may have been a moral hazard problem with fellow servants taking inade-
quate care to prevent accidents that would hurt others. This would have increased
the problems for insurers of selling accident insurance to workers. Workers' com-
pensation helped reduce this problem since the entire workplace was covered un-
der the employers' insurance premium. On the other hand, under workers' com-
pensation workers had incentives to take less care generally, forcing employers to
pay compensation for some accidents that might not have occurred under negli-
gence liability. This gave employers more incentives to prevent accidents. In the
final analysis, we do not believe spillover effects to have been nearly so important
for the adoption of workers' compensation as they are for modern automobile
accident liability. For a good discussion of the political and economic issues related
to no-fault liability for automobile accidents, see Harrington (1994).
The payment of medical expenses is one area where spillovers may pose a sig-
nificant problem in modern workers' compensation, which often offers first dollar
coverage with high limits for medical care associated with a workplace accident.
A worker whose medical problems potentially could be related to a workplace
injury therefore has greater incentives to claim that the condition is work related
and therefore obtain repayment of their medical costs. This has led to calls for
a merger of employer health insurance with the medical component of workers'
compensation to reduce this spillover effect.
Shawn Kantor (1998) has made a recent attempt to disentangle the process
of institutional change in his analysis of the development of property rights and
fencing laws in postbellum Georgia.
Alston (1996, 25-26), however, cautions that "the dynamics of institutional
change frequently include unintended consequences that take on a life of their
own. For this reason I warn against a functionalist approach to institutional analy-
sis whereby the motivations for particular institutions are judged from the conse-
quences of the institutional change." 'While Alston's concerns are warranted, we
do not believe that careful empirical analysis of the effects of institutional change
should not be considered a useful starting point in beginning to understand the
process of building a political coalition in favor of a particular institutional
change. Scholars must use their judgment to assess whether the findings of these
empirical studies are consistent with theory and the historical context within
which the institutional change is debated.